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attack under given circumstances.
Can we do the same for software?
I’ve sometimes quoted Lord
Kelvin:
“If you can not measure it,
you can not improve it.”
“When you can measure
what you are speaking about,
and express it in numbers, you
know something about it; but 
when you cannot measure it,
when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge is
of a meagre and unsatisfactory
kind; it may be the beginning
of knowledge, but you have
scarcely in your thoughts ad-
vanced to the state of science,
whatever the matter may be.”
But I’ve reluctantly concluded that
current architectures aren’t amen-
able to metrics of the sort I want.
Here’s why.
It’s well known that any single
defense can fail. More precisely, we
all know that any piece of software
can be buggy, including security
software—the list is alarmingly long.
This means that whatever the de-
fense, a single well-placed blow can
shatter it. We can layer defenses, but
once a layer is broken, the next layer
is exposed; it, of course, has the same
problem. Paul Karger and Roger
Schell noted more than 30 years ago
the difficulty of defending against an
attacker who had purchased a copy
of a system and could probe each
layer offline (http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/history/karg74.pdf ).
In most situations, we must defend
against threats of precisely this na-
ture. This is why metrics are so hard:
the attacker’s effort is linear (rather
than exponential) in the number of
layers, and each effort is low in cost.
What we need are defense systems
with this exponential property—sys-
tems in which getting through two
layers is proportional to the product
(not the sum) of each layer’s difficulty.
If our defense systems have this prop-
erty, we have some hope of measur-
ing their strength. The constant for
any one layer might remain small—
this is, after all, software that we’re
dealing with—but we’ve somehow
found a compositional principle that
negates the linear effect.
Unfortunately, we don’t know
how to do this. One possibility
might be to use randomization tech-
niques to increase the attack constant
for a particular layer, but we’re still
dealing with software, and the
attacker might go around our ran-
domization. Thus, we can use ran-
dom stack frame layouts, similar to
OpenBSD’s, to defend against buffer
overflows; the attacker, though,
could launch an SQL-injection at-
tack. Perhaps we could use intrusion
detection and repair at each layer. If
we can do that, the holes won’t stay
open at first; the attacker will have to
continually relaunch the attack. This
presupposes that we can build such
self-repairing software—research on
it is still at a very early stage—and it
won’t be subject to the same brittle-
ness. In any event, the repair would
have to succeed before the next layer
was penetrated or some autonomous
attack code could continue the at-
tack on inner layers, even though the
outer layers had been repaired.
The problem, of course, is that
such systems don’t exist. Each layer’s
strength approximates zero, so
adding them together doesn’t help.
We need layers of assured strength,
but we don’t have them. I thus very
reluctantly conclude that security
metrics are chimeras for the foresee-
able future. We can develop proba-
bilities of vulnerability, based on
things like Microsoft’s Relative At-
tack Surface Quotient, the effort ex-
pended in code audits, and the like,
but we can’t measure strength until
we overcome brittleness. And until
we can measure security, we can’t
improve it. 
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ow secure is a computer system? Bridges have a
load limit, but it isn’t determined (as “Calvin and
Hobbes” would have it) by building an identical
bridge and running trucks over it until it collapses.
In a more relevant vein, safes are rated for how long they’ll resist
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